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1Abstract
Channel systems for conducting monetary policy are becoming increasingly
popular. Despite its popularity, the consequences of implementing policy with
a channel system are not well understood. We develop a general equilibrium
framework of a channel system and study the optimal policy. A novel aspect
of the channel system is that a central bank can ￿tighten￿ or ￿loosen￿ its
policy without changing its policy rate. This policy instrument has so far been
overlooked by a large body of the literature on the optimal design of interest-
rate rules.
JEL: E40, E50, D83
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Interest Rates, Search.
21 Introduction
Channel systems for conducting monetary policy are becoming increasingly popular.1
Several central banks already use a channel system, and others are using at least
some features of the channel system.2 Despite its popularity, the consequences of
implementing monetary policy with a channel system are not well understood. How
does implementation of monetary policy in a channel system di⁄er from plain-vanilla
open market operations? Why do central banks choose di⁄erent corridors? Most
central banks choose an interest-corridor of 50 basis points (e.g., Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand), while the European Central Bank (ECB) chooses one of 200 basis
points. Why can some central banks control the overnight interest rate very tightly,
while others cannot? For instance, the Euro repo rate ￿ uctuates considerably around
the minimum bid rate set by the ECB (Figure 1), and it tends to be above the
minimum bid rate. In contrast, the overnight interbank cash rate in New Zealand is
almost always equal to the policy rate (Figure 2).
There are several stylized facts that a reasonable theoretical model of channel sys-
tems has to explain. First, all central banks set a strictly positive interest-rate spread
- de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the lending and the deposit rates. Second, central
banks typically react to changing economic conditions by increasing or decreasing
their interest-rate corridor without changing its spread. Third, the money market
1In a channel system, a central bank o⁄ers two facilities: a lending facility whereby it is ready
to supply money overnight at a given lending rate against collateral and a deposit facility whereby
banks can make overnight deposits to earn a deposit rate. The interest-rate corridor is chosen to
keep the overnight interest rate in the money market close to the target rate. In a pure channel
system, a change in policy is implemented by simply changing the corridor without any open market
operations.
2For example, versions of a channel system are operated by the Bank of Canada, the Bank of
England, the European Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand. The US Federal Reserve System recently modi￿ed the operating procedures of its discount
window facility in such a way that it now shares elements of a standing facility. Prior to 2003, the
discount window rate was set below the target federal funds rate, but banks faced penalties when
accessing the discount window. In 2003, the Federal Reserve decided to set the discount window
rate 100 basis points above the target federal funds rate and eased access conditions to the discount
window. The resulting framework is similar to a channel system, where the deposit rate is zero and
the lending rate 100 basis points above the target rate.
3rate tends to be in the middle or slightly above the middle of the corridor.
Figure 1:  Interest rate channel of the European Central Bank.
EONIA (Euro Overnight Index Average) and Eurepo (reference rate for the GC repo market)












































































































































































































































































































































































To study these stylized facts, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of
a channel system with a money market and a welfare-optimizing central bank. Market
participants are subject to idiosyncratic trading shocks that generate random liquidity
needs. The shocks can be partially insured in a secured money market. To provide
further insurance, the central bank operates facilities where market participants can
borrow or deposit money at the speci￿ed rates. In accordance with central bank
practice, there is no limit to the size of deposits on which interest is paid, and there
is no limit to the size of a loan that a market participant can obtain provided that
the loan is fully collateralized. Finally, the cost of pledging collateral is explicit and
money is essential.3
Within this framework we answer the following three questions. First, what is the
optimal interest-rate corridor? Second, what is the optimal collateral policy? Third,
how does a change in the corridor a⁄ect the money market rate?
3By ￿ essential,￿we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota 1998
and Wallace 2001).
4Figure 2: Interest-rate channel of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Overnight Interbank Cash Rate

























































































































































































































































































































The following results emerge from our model. First, it is optimal to have a positive
spread if the opportunity cost of holding collateral is positive, and the optimal spread
is decreasing in the rate of return of the collateral.4 Second, the money market rate
is above the target rate if the opportunity cost of holding collateral is positive. This
property of the model is consistent with the fact that the collateralized Eurepo rate
tends to be above the minimum bid rate (Figure 1). Third, a central bank has two
equivalent options for implementing a given policy: it can either shift the corridor
while keeping the spread constant, or it can change the spread. For instance, to change
its policy, it can keep the deposit rate constant and only change the borrowing rate,
as done, for example, by the US Federal Reserve System, or it can shift the corridor
without changing its spread as done by the European Central Bank.
An interesting aspect of the channel system is that a central bank can ￿tighten￿or
￿loosen￿its policy without changing its target rate. The reason is that by increasing
the spread of the corridor symmetrically around the target rate, the central bank
worsens the option for banks of accessing the standing facility. As a result, the
policy regime is tighter.5 This suggests that a characterization of policy through an
4The rate of return of the collateral determines the opportunity costs for commercial banks of
accessing the lending facility where a high rate of return implies a small or zero opportunity cost.
5This result suggests that the ECB with its 200-basis-point corridor implements a tighter mone-
5interest-rate rule, as is commonly done in a large body of the literature, is incomplete.
Rather, in a channel system, any policy must be characterized through an interest-
rate corridor rule. We provide more discussion on this result in the literature section
below.
Literature There are very few theoretical studies of channel systems, and all of
them are partial equilibrium models.6 An early contribution is the model of reserves
management under uncertainty by Poole (1968). Woodford (2000, 2001, 2003) dis-
cusses and analyzes the channel system to address the question of how to conduct
monetary policy in a world with a vanishing stock of money. Whitesell (2006) eval-
uates reserves regimes versus channel systems. Elements of channel systems have
been previously discussed in Gaspar, Quiros, and Mendizabal (2004) and Guthrie
and Wright (2000).
It appears that there are two reasons why there is no other general equilibrium
analysis of a channel system. First, money growth is endogenous in such a system. In
contrast, most theoretical models of monetary policy characterize optimal policy in
terms of a path for the money supply. In practice, however, monetary policy involves
rules for setting nominal interest rates, and most central banks specify operating
targets for overnight interest rates.7 This paper, therefore, is a further attempt to
break the apparent dichotomy (Goodhart, 1989) between theoretical analysis and
central bank practices.
The second reason is related to the widespread belief that modeling the details
of the framework used to implement a given interest-rate rule is unimportant when
tary policy than the other central banks operating a channel system as mentioned before.
6There are general equilibrium models that study discount window loans. An early paper is Sar-
gent and Wallace (1982). Williamson (2005) considers a general equilibrium model where the central
bank provides one-period zero-nominal-interest loans. As in our model, these discount window loans
are ￿nanced by the issue of outside money. He shows that this arrangement yields a Pareto optimal
allocation and that this allocation can also be supported with unregulated interbank lending and
without outside money.
7This fact is also emphasized in Woodford￿ s (2003) book at the beginning of Chapter 2: ￿While
virtually all central banks use short-term nominal interest rates (...) as their instrument (...), the
theoretical literature in monetary economics has concerned itself almost entirely with the analysis
of policies that are described by alternative (...) paths for the money supply.￿
6analyzing optimal monetary policy. That is, it is taken for granted that the economic
consequences of interest-rate rules do not hinge on the speci￿c details of monetary
policy implementation. However, our analysis reveals that a characterization of op-
timal policy and its implementation cannot be separated. To see this, consider any
interest-rate rule in a system with zero deposit rate as operated, for example, by
the US Federal Reserve System. Such an interest-rate rule uniquely determines how
￿tight￿or ￿loose￿policy is. In contrast, the same rule or any other interest-rate rule
has no meaning in a channel system, since it does not determine whether a policy is
￿tight￿or ￿loose.￿Consequently, in a channel system optimal policy must not only
state an interest-rate rule, but it must also state an interest-rate corridor rule. This
is a new insight, which goes beyond what we already know from the large and growing
body of literature on the optimal design of interest-rate rules.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the environment. The
equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. Optimal monetary policy with an inactive
money market is derived in Section 4, and Section 5 characterizes policy with an active
money market. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the policy implications that arise from
the model, and Section 7 concludes. All proofs and a description of the Euro money
markets and the ECB￿ s operating procedures can be found in the Appendix.
2 Environment
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model, populated by a [0,1]-continuum of
in￿nitely lived market participants, where in each period three perfectly competitive
markets open sequentially (Figure 3). The ￿rst market is a settlement market, where
all claims from the previous period are settled. The second market is a money market,
where lending and borrowing against collateral takes place. Finally, at the beginning
of the third market, after the close of the money market, the standing facility and
goods market open.
The sequence of markets and collateral requirements are motivated by the func-
tioning of existing channel systems. For example, the key features of the ECB￿ s
implementation framework and of the Euro money market are the following.8 First,
8These key features are shared by all central banks that operate standing facilities.
7any outstanding overnight loans at the ECB are settled at the beginning of the day.
Second, most lending in the Euro money market and all credit obtained at the ECB￿ s
standing facility is collateralized. Third, the Euro money market operates between
7 am and 5 pm. Fourth, after the money market has closed, market participants
can access the ECB￿ s facilities for an additional 30 minutes. This means that after
the close of the money market, the ECB￿ s lending facility is the only possibility for
obtaining overnight liquidity. Also, any late payments received can still be deposited
at the deposit facility of the ECB.




interest  rate iy
Signal
Standing Facility Goods Market
deposit rate id
lending rate il
Figure 3: Sequence of markets.
We now discuss these markets in detail, starting with the goods market, which
opens at the end of the period.
Goods market At the beginning of the third market, agents receive idiosyncratic
preference and technology shocks that determine whether they consume or produce
in this market. With probability 1 ￿ n an agent can consume and cannot produce:
we refer to these agents as buyers. With probability n, an agent can produce and
cannot consume: these are sellers. These trading shocks capture the liquidity shocks
faced by commercial banks after the money market has closed.
A buyer gets utility u(q) from q consumption in the third market, where u0(q) > 0,
u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +1 and u0(1) = 0. Producers incur a utility cost c(q) = q from
producing q units of output. The discount factor is ￿ where for technical reasons we
assume that ￿ > n.
A key friction is that market participants are anonymous. Since sellers require
immediate compensation for their production e⁄ort, money is essential for trade.
8Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), and Aliprantis et al. (2007) provide a detailed
discussion of the features that generate an essential role for money. In addition to
money we also have collateral, and we need to say why money plays this role and not
collateral. We address this issue by assuming, as in Lester et al. (2007), that collateral
cannot be physically brought into the goods market and market participants cannot
recognize counterfeit claims to collateral, while they can always recognize currency.9
Money market Participants in money markets face considerable uncertainty about
their end-of-day liquidity position. This explains why they trade in the money market
and also use the central bank￿ s facilities after the money market has closed. To capture
this obervation, we assume that at the beginning of the second market, participants
receive a signal about the probability that they will become buyers or sellers in the
goods market. With probability ￿k, an agent receives the information that he will be
a seller with probability nk, k = H;L, where " ￿ nH ￿ nL 2 [0;1]. We assume that
n =
P
k=H;L ￿knk so that there is no aggregate uncertainty.
This modeling approach captures the idea that, when the money market is open,
market participants receive information about their end-of-day cash holdings. Some
market participants believe that they are likely to have excess cash at the end of the
day, and others that they are likely to be short of cash. The di⁄erence in expected
liquidity needs generates an incentive to trade in the money market. The imprecision
of the signal captures the uncertainty that participants in money markets face about
their end-of-day liquidity position.
There are three cases. If " = 0, the signal contains no information, and so agents
have no gains from trading in the money market. Consequently, no trade occurs in
the money market. If " = 1, there is no uncertainty about the liquidity shock in the
goods market. Consequently, the portfolios are completely adjusted in the money
market, and no agent accesses the facilities. Finally, if " 2 (0;1), the signal contains
9Due to the essentiality of a medium of exchange, our paper is in the tradition of the search-
theoretic approach to monetary economics, an approach initiated by the seminal paper of Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989). Important contributions to this approach are Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), Trejos
and Wright (1995), Shi (1995, 1997) and more recently Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and
Wright (2005). Wallace (2001) discusses why random matching and bargaining are not crucial for
the essentiality of money.
9some information about the future liquidity shock, but the information is not perfect.
As a result, agents use both the money market and the standing facility to adjust
their portfolio. For example, some agents will get the information that they will be
sellers with high probability but then turn out to be buyers. These agents will ￿rst
use the money market to trade away their cash and then use the lending facility to
take out loans.
Settlement market In the ￿rst market, agents produce and consume general
goods, repay loans, redeem deposits, and adjust their money balances. General goods
are produced solely from inputs of labor according to a constant return to scale pro-
duction technology where one unit of the consumption good is produced with one unit
of labor generating one unit of disutility. Thus, producing h units of the general good
implies disutility ￿h, while consuming h units gives utility h. The purpose of this
market is that market participants can settle their overnight debt at the beginning of
the period.10
2.1 Borrowing and lending facilities
At the beginning of the third market, after the idiosyncratic trading shocks are ob-
served, the central bank o⁄ers a borrowing and a deposit facility. The central bank
operates at zero cost and o⁄ers nominal loans ‘ at an interest rate i‘ and promises to
pay interest rate id on nominal deposits d with i‘ ￿ id.
Since we focus on facilities provided by the central bank, we restrict ￿nancial
contracts to overnight contracts. An agent who borrows ‘ units of money from the
central bank in market 3 repays (1 + i‘)‘ units of money in market 1 of the following
period. Also, an agent who deposits d units of money at the central bank in market
3 of period t receives (1 + id)d units of money in market 1 of the following period.
10A convenient feature of these assumptions about preferences and technology is that they keep
the distribution of money balances analytically tractable as in Lagos and Wright (2005). As we
will see below, in equilibrium all households will hold the same amounts of money and collateral
when they move on to the money market. Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2007) explain why the
settlement market is necessary.
10Collateral As in current practice, we assume that the central bank provides credit
only against collateral. In practice, collateral typically consists of low-risk and low-
yield assets such as government securities. Here, we assume that general goods pro-
duced in market 1 can be stored and used as collateral. The storage technology has
constant return to scales and yields R ￿ 1 units of general goods in market 1 of the
following period. We impose ￿R ￿ 1, since when ￿R > 1, agents would store in￿nite
amounts of goods, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
The central bank operates the money market and keeps track of all ￿nancial
arrangements and collateral holdings. In particular, collateral cannot be used to
secure trade credit between a seller and a buyer in the goods market. Moreover, while
the central bank keeps track of the ￿nancial history of agents, it has no knowledge of
the agents￿goods market transactions. Given this, money is still essential for trade
in the goods market.11
Monetary policy The central bank has three policy instruments: the deposit rate
id, the lending rate i‘, and lump-sum transfers T = ￿M, which we assume take place
in market 1. Since central banks have no ￿scal authority, we restrict these lump-sum
transfers to be positive, that is, ￿ ￿ 0.12 The lump-sum transfers are a substitute
for open-market operations that we do not model here. Note that in a pure channel
system central banks do not use open-market operations to a⁄ect the money market
rate on a regular basis. Nevertheless, we don￿ t rule this possibility out. Later, we will
show that it is optimal to set ￿ = 0.
Note that a central bank can change policy in two ways (even for ￿ = 0). It
can either increase or decrease ￿ ￿ i‘ ￿ id, holding the policy rate (or target rate)
11There is an inherent tension between money and credit, since the essentiality of money requires
the absence of record keeping, whereas credit demands record keeping. Aiyagari and Williamson
(2000) and Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) show how credit can be introduced into a micro-
founded model of money while keeping money essential.
12Andolfatto (2007) and Sanchez, Williamson and Wright (2007) investigate the informational
structure in the Lagos-Wright framework that prevents the central bank from using lump-sum taxes
and hence running the Friedman rule. We take a short-cut here by simply assuming that it cannot
tax, which is consistent with central bank practice and the part of the literature which assumes that
the central bank has no enforcement power and is therefore unable to tax (e.g., Kocherlakota 2003,
Berentsen and Waller 2008).
11ip = (i‘ + id)=2 constant, or it can change ip while holding ￿ constant. We will discuss
the implications below.
In a channel system, the money stock evolves endogenously as follows
M+ = M ￿ i‘L + idD + ￿M (1)
where M denotes the per capita stock of money at the beginning of period t. In the
￿rst market, total loans L are repaid. Since interest-rate payments by the agents are
i‘L, the stock of money shrinks by this amount. Interest payments by the central
bank on total deposits are idD. The central bank simply prints additional money to
make these interest payments, causing the stock of money to increase by this amount.
Finally, the central bank can also change the stock of money via lump-sum transfers
T = ￿M in market 1.
2.2 First-best allocation
In the Appendix, we show that at the beginning of a period the expected lifetime
utility of the representative agent for a stationary allocation (q;b), where q is con-
sumption and b collateral holdings, is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)W = (1 ￿ n)[u(q) ￿ q] + (￿R ￿ 1)b: (2)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of the equation is the expected utility from
consuming and producing the market 3 good. The second term is the utility of
producing collateral and receiving the return in the following period.
It is obvious that the ￿rst-best allocation (q￿;b￿) satis￿es q = q￿, where q￿ is the
value of q that solves u0(q) = 1. Moreover, b￿ = 0 if ￿R < 1, and b￿ is indeterminate
if ￿R = 1. Thus, a social planner would never choose a positive amount of collateral
when collateral is costly.
3 Symmetric stationary equilibrium
In period t, let ￿ ￿ 1=P be the real price of money in market 1, where P is the price of
goods in market 1. We focus on symmetric and stationary equilibria, where all agents
12follow identical strategies and where the real allocation is constant over time. In a
stationary equilibrium, beginning-of-period real money balances are time-invariant
￿M = ￿+M+: (3)
This implies that ￿=￿+ = P+=P = M+=M is constant. Denote ￿ ￿ M+=M the
time-invariant (endogenous) growth rate of the money supply.
W(m;b;‘;d;y) denotes the expected value of entering the ￿rst market with m units
of money, b collateral, ‘ loans, d deposits and private credit y, where y > 0 means that
the agent has borrowed money in the money market of the previous period. Z(m;b)
denotes the expected value from entering the money market with m units of money
and b collateral. For notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the value
function on the time index t. In what follows, we look at a representative period t.
3.1 Settlement
Denote the real gross interest rate on central bank loans and deposits, and private
credit by R‘ ￿ ￿(1 + i‘;￿1), Rd ￿ ￿(1 + id;￿1) and Ry ￿ ￿(1 + iy;￿1), respectively.13
In the ￿rst market, the problem of the representative agent is:
W(m;b;‘;d;y) = max
h;m2;b2
￿h + Z (m2;b2)
s:t: ￿m2 + b2 = h + ￿m + Rb + Rdd ￿ R‘‘ ￿ Ryy + ￿￿M:
where h is hours worked in market 1, m2 is the amount of money brought in to the
second market, and b2 is the amount of collateral brought in to the second market.
Using the budget constraint to eliminate h in the objective function, one obtains the
￿rst-order conditions
Zm ￿ ￿ ( = if m > 0 ) (4)
Zb ￿ 1 ( = if b > 0 ) (5)
Zm ￿
@Z(m2;b2)
@m2 is the marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into
the second market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is one, ￿￿
is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of money in the ￿rst market of period t.
13The subscript ￿1 indicates that the interest rate has been agreed on in period t ￿ 1.
13Zb ￿
@V (m2;b2)
@b2 is the marginal value of taking additional collateral into the second
market in period t. Since the marginal disutility of working is 1, ￿1 is the utility
cost of acquiring one unit of collateral in the ￿rst market of period t. The implication
of (4) and (5) is that all agents enter the following period with the same amount of
money and the same quantity of collateral (which can be zero).
The envelope conditions are
Wm = ￿;Wb = R;W‘ = ￿R‘;Wd = Rd;Wy = ￿Ry (6)
where Wj is the partial derivative of W(m;b;‘;d;y) with respect to j = m;b;‘;d;y.
3.2 Money market
Let yk be the amount of money borrowed in the money market when signal k = L;H
is received. An agent who has m money and b collateral at the opening of market 2















k ￿ Rb=Ry and m + y
k ￿ 0:
The ￿rst inequality is the borrowing constraint. The second inequality implies that









yd = 0 (7)
where ￿+￿￿
k
y‘ is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint and ￿+￿￿
k
yd is the multi-
plier on the short-selling constraint. In any equilibrium, those agents who are likely
to become sellers do not borrow money, and those who are likely to become buyers
do not lend money. Consequently, we have ￿
H
y‘ = 0 and ￿
L















y‘ = 0: (9)


























since in any equilibrium ￿
H
y‘ = 0.

















Thus, the marginal value of money at the beginning of the money market is equal to
the expected value of buying goods in market 3, ￿LV L
m, plus the expected value of
lending it in the money market, ￿￿HV H
y .





k = 0: (12)
3.3 Liquidity shocks
At the beginning of market 3, an agent￿ s state is revealed. Consider an agent who
received signal k. Let qk and qk
s respectively denote the quantities he consumes or




s) respectively denote the loan he obtains
from the central bank and the amount of money he deposits in this market. If this
agent holds m money, b collateral and private debt y at the opening of this market,
he has expected lifetime utility
V
k(m;b;y) = (1 ￿ n
k)[u(q






























chosen optimally as follows.
It is obvious that buyers will never deposit funds in the central bank and sellers
will never take out loans, and therefore, dk
b = 0 and ‘k
s = 0. For the rest of the paper,
to simplify notation, we let ‘k ￿ ‘k
b and dk ￿ dk
s. Accordingly, we obtain
V
k(m;b;y) = (1 ￿ n
k)[u(q

















s, qk;‘k and dk solve the following optimization problems.











dk ￿ 0.14 Using (6), the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
p￿￿+ + p￿￿+￿d = 1 (13)
id = ￿d (14)
where ￿￿+￿d is the multiplier on the deposit constraint. The two conditions can be
combined to give
p￿￿+ (1 + id) = 1: (15)
If an agent is a buyer, he solves the following maximization problem:
max
qk;‘k u(q





k ￿ m + ‘
k and ‘
k ￿ ￿ ‘
where the maximal amount that a buyer can borrow from the central bank ￿ ‘ solves
R‘￿ ‘ = bR ￿ yRy: (16)
On the left-hand side is the total repayment R‘￿ ‘ when an agent borrows ￿ ‘. On the
right-hand side is the total disposable collateral at the time of repayment, since b
units of collateral transform into Rb units of real goods. From this amount, the real
debt obligation from the money market yRy must be deducted.
Using (6), the buyer￿ s ￿rst-order conditions can be written as
u
0(q







‘ + i‘ (18)
where ￿￿+￿
k
q is the multiplier of the buyer￿ s budget constraint and ￿￿+￿
k
‘ the multi-









14Sellers can deposit their money holdings, including the proceeds from their latest transaction.
This is in line with the institutional details described in the Introduction where banks can access
the standing facility of the ECB 30 minutes after the close of the money market.
16If the borrowing constraint is not binding, and the central bank sets i‘ = id, trades
are e¢ cient. If the borrowing constraint is binding, then u0(q) > 1, and trades are
ine¢ cient even when i‘ = id.
Using the envelope theorem and (17), the marginal value of money in market 3 is
V
k





The marginal value of money has a straightforward interpretation. An agent with
an additional unit of money becomes a buyer with probability 1 ￿ n, in which case
he acquires 1=p units of goods yielding additional utility u0(q)=p. With probability
n, he becomes a seller, in which case he deposits his money overnight, yielding the
real return Rd. Note that the standing facility increases the marginal value of money
because agents can earn interest on idle cash.
3.4 Liquidity premium
Since in equilibrium there is no default, the real return of collateral is ￿R. The real
return, ￿R, is smaller than the marginal value, Vb, if ￿‘ > 0. To see this, use the
envelope theorem to derive the marginal value of collateral in the third market
V
k
b = (1 ￿ n
k)￿￿+￿
k
‘R=R‘ + ￿R: (21)
Thus, the di⁄erence between the real return and the marginal value is (1￿nk)￿￿+￿
k
‘R=R‘.
This quantity is positive if collateral relaxes the borrowing constraints of the buyers;
i.e., if ￿
k
‘ > 0. It is critical for the working of the model that V k
b > ￿R. The reason is
that, since ￿R￿1 is negative, agents are willing to hold collateral only if its liquidity
value as expressed by the shadow price ￿
k
‘ is positive.
To derive the liquidity premium on the collateral, assume, for simplicity, that
" = 0, and then use the ￿rst-order conditions (5) and (19) to write (21) as follows:
1 ￿ ￿R = (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q)￿R=￿ ￿ ￿R] (22)
The term ￿R=￿, where ￿ ￿ R‘=Rd, is the price of goods in terms of collateral in
market 3. A buyer can use one unit of collateral to borrow R=R‘ units of money,
which allows him to acquire (R=R‘)=p = ￿R(Rd=R‘) = ￿R=￿ units of goods.
17The right-hand side of equation (22) is the collateral￿ s liquidity premium. While
collateral costs 1 util to produce, its return is ￿R ￿ 1. Hence, if ￿R < 1, agents need
an incentive to hold collateral. This is provided by making collateral liquid.15
4 No trade in the money market
In this section, to focus on the central bank￿ s facilities, we consider the case where
the signal contains no information, i.e., " = 0. In this case, agents have no gains
from trading in the money market. Consequently, they use the lending and deposit
facilities only to adjust their money holdings. We will consider the case " 2 (0;1) in
Section 5.




￿ (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q)=￿ ￿ 1] ( = if b > 0 ): (23)
Then (4), (15), (20), and taking into account that in a stationary equilibrium M+=M =
￿=￿+ = ￿, yield
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + id)
￿ (1 + id)
= (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q) ￿ 1]: (24)
Also, from (1), since L = (1 ￿ n)‘ and D = nd, we get




where zm ￿ m=p and z‘ ￿ ‘=p. To derive this equation, we use d = m + pqs, market
clearing nqs = (1 ￿ n)q, and we take into account that in symmetric equilibrium all
agents hold identical amounts of money when they enter market 3. Then, from the
budget constraint of the buyer, we have
q = zm + z‘: (26)
Finally, since ￿R < 1 in any equilibrium where agents hold collateral, it must be the
15In microfounded models of money, liquidity premia arise naturally. See, for example, Lagos
(2005), Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2007), or Telyukova and Wright (2006).
18case that the borrowing constraint is binding and so from (15) and (16) we get16
z‘ = ￿Rb=￿: (27)
We can use these ￿ve equations to de￿ne a symmetric stationary equilibrium. They
determine the endogenous variables (￿;q;z‘;zm;b). Note that all other endogenous
variables can be derived from these equilibrium values.
De￿nition 1 A symmetric stationary equilibrium with " = 0 is a policy (id;i‘;￿) and
a time-invariant list (￿;q;z‘;zm;b) satisfying (23)-(27) with z‘ ￿ 0 and zm ￿ 0.
Let
~ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿n + ￿=(1 + id)
1=R ￿ n￿
: (28)
Then we have the following:
Proposition 1 For any (id;i‘;￿) with i‘ ￿ id ￿ 0, there exists a unique symmetric
stationary equilibrium such that
z‘ > 0 and zm = 0 if and only if ￿ = 1
z‘ > 0 and zm > 0 if and only if 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿
z‘ = 0 and zm > 0 if and only if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿:
Several points are worth mentioning. First, market participants are willing to
acquire collateral if the borrowing rate relative to the deposit rate is not too high;
i.e., if ￿ < ~ ￿. Second, the critical value ~ ￿ is increasing in R and ￿, and so is b.
Furthermore, agents increase their collateral holdings and hence ￿nance a larger share
of their consumption by borrowing if R or ￿ is increased. Third, if ￿ = 1, agents are
not willing to hold money across periods. They just use collateral to borrow money
to ￿nance their consumption. This, however, does not mean that money is not used,
since it still plays the role of a medium of exchange in market 3. It means only that
agents do not want to hold it across periods.
16If the borrowing constraint is non-binding (￿‘ = 0), equation (21) reduces to Vb = ￿R, implying
from (5) that b = 0 since we have ￿R < 1. Consequently, in any equilibrium where agents hold
collateral, it must be the case that the constraint is binding.
19How should we interpret the result that we can have z‘ > 0 and zm = 0 for large
values of i‘ and id if ￿ = 1? The reason is that the cost of transforming collateral
into consumption depends not only on i‘ but also on id. To see this, note that with
one unit of collateral a buyer can borrow R=R‘ units of money, which allows him to
acquire (R=R‘)=p units of goods. From the ￿rst order conditions of the sellers, the
price of goods is p = 1=[￿Rd]. Hence, he can aquire ￿R(Rd=R‘) = ￿R=￿ units of
goods. The crucial point is that even though the buyer pays a high nominal interest
rate, the price of goods adjusts to re￿ ect the fact that the seller can deposit the money
and earn the high interest id. The same explanation holds for z‘ > 0 and zm > 0 if
1 < ￿ < ~ ￿.
Given a real allocation fq (￿);b(￿)g any pair (i‘;id) satisfying ￿ =
1+i‘
1+id is con-
sistent with this allocation. Thus, there are many ways to implement a given policy
￿. The allocations di⁄er only in the rate of in￿ ation.17 This can be seen from (25)
which can be written as follows
￿ ￿ ￿
1 + id




Since the right-hand side of the equation is a constant for a given ￿, the in￿ ation
rate ￿ ￿ 1 is increasing in id. To keep ￿ constant when increasing id, one needs to
increase i‘ accordingly.
4.1 Optimal policy
We now derive the optimal policy. The central bank￿ s objective is to maximize the
expected lifetime utility of the representative agent. It does so by choosing lump-sum
transfers ￿, consumption q and collateral holding b to maximize (2) subject to the
constraint that its choice is consistent with the allocation given by (23)-(26). Given
￿, the policy is implemented by choosing ￿.
Assume ￿rst that it is optimal to set ￿ ￿ ~ ￿. In this case, no agent is using the
lending facility which implies that b = 0. Moreover, from (24) and (25) q satis￿es
~ q(￿) = u
0￿1
￿




17One can show that this is not the case when sellers can￿ t access the deposit facility after the
goods market.
20Note that ~ q is independent of ￿ when ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, and so any ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, implements the
same real allocation (b;q) = (0; ~ q). Now consider the largest q that the central bank
can implement. From (23) the largest q is attained when ￿ = 1. It satis￿es







Thus, the policy ￿ = 1 attains the allocation (b;q) = (^ q=(￿R); ^ q), since no agent
is holding money across the period when ￿ = 1. Accordingly, the central bank is
constrained to choose quantities q such that ^ q ￿ q ￿ ~ q(￿).




= (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q)=￿ ￿ 1] (29)







(1 ￿ n)(￿ ￿ 1)
1 + ￿n(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿=R + ￿=(1 + id)
￿
:
Thus, the central bank is constrained to choose an allocation that satis￿es (29) and
(30), and so the central bank￿ s maximization problem is
max
q;b;￿
(1 ￿ n)[u(q) ￿ q] + (￿R ￿ 1)b







and ^ q ￿ q ￿ ~ q(￿)
where to derive (31), we use (29) to replace ￿ in (30).
Proposition 2 ￿ = 0 is optimal. Also, there exists a critical value R such that if




The striking result of Proposition 2 is that it is never optimal to set a zero interest-
rate spread ￿ = i‘ ￿ id. The reason is that, for society, the use of collateral is costly,
since ￿R ￿ 1 is negative. The bene￿t of collateral is that it increases consumption
above q = ~ q. The central bank thus faces a trade-o⁄. It can encourage the use
21of costly collateral to increase consumption. The optimal policy simply equates the
marginal bene￿t of additional consumption to the marginal cost of holding collateral.
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to collateral, the use of ￿at money is not
costly for society since money can be produced without cost.
If R is small (R < R), it is optimal for the central bank to discourage the use of
collateral.18 It does so by implementing an interest-rate policy that satis￿es ￿ ￿ ~ ￿.





￿nance some of their consumption using the lending facility. An increase in R reduces
the optimal ￿. In the limit, as R ! 1=￿; the holding of collateral becomes costless.
We consider the optimal policy in this limiting case below.
According to Proposition 2, it is optimal to set ￿ = 0. To see why, note that ^ q
is independent of ￿, and ~ q is decreasing in ￿. Therefore, increasing ￿ increases the
set of attainable allocations, but only by decreasing the lower bound of the feasible
q￿ s. Then, since F is decreasing in ￿, an increase in ￿ either increases b, decreases
q or both. This reduces welfare unambiguously. Hence, it is optimal to set ￿ to
zero. The intuition is that an increase in ￿ is equivalent to an increase in in￿ ation.
The in￿ ation tax reduces the sellers￿willingness to produce for money and so agents
substitute bonds for money.
We now consider the case when holding collateral is costless, i.e., when R =
1=￿. To avoid indeterminacies of the equilibrium allocation, we consider the limiting
allocation when the rate of return of the collateral satis￿es R ! 1=￿.19 In this
limiting case, the critical value is ~ ￿ =
1￿￿n
￿￿￿n > 1 and Proposition 1 continues to hold.
With costless collateral, the optimal policy is i‘ ! id. This policy implements the
￿rst-best allocation q￿. Interestingly, under this policy when i‘ ! id > 0 the price
level approaches in￿nity. The reason is that agents are now unwilling to hold money,
since it is strictly dominated in return by collateral.
18This is similar to Lagos and Rocheteau (2004), albeit in a very di⁄erent context. They construct
a model where capital competes with ￿at money as a medium of exchange. They show that when
the socially e¢ cient stock of capital is low (which is the case when the rate of return is low), a
monetary equilibrium exists that dominates the non-monetary one in terms of welfare. So in this
case, it would be optimal to discourage the use of capital as a medium of exchange.
19At R = 1=￿ agents are indi⁄erent to how much collateral they acquire.
22Policy implications We conclude this section with a summary of the policy impli-
cations of the model. First, market participants are willing to borrow if the borrowing
rate relative to the deposit rate is not too high. Second, if i‘ = id so that the spread is
zero, agents are not willing to carry money across periods. Third, if holding collateral
is costly, it is never optimal to set a zero interest-rate corridor because of the trade-
o⁄ between costly collateral and extra consumption. Fourth, lump-sum injections of
money are never optimal. Fifth, an e¢ cient allocation can be attained only if holding
collateral is costless, i.e., if R ! 1=￿. In this case, the optimal policy is to set a zero
interest-rate corridor.
5 Trade in the money market
We now assume that " > 0. Recall that at the beginning of the money market, agents
receive a signal about the probability that they will become a consumer or a producer
in the third market. With probability ￿k, an agent receives the information that he
will be a seller with probability nk, k = H;L.
We focus on the case where " = nH ￿nL is small. This case captures the situation
where agents￿liquidity needs in the money market are not too di⁄erent from each
other and not too di⁄erent from their initial beliefs. In this case, they are reluctant
to pledge all their collateral or to sell all their money holdings in the money market.
Consequently, the short-selling constraints in the money market are non-binding. This
essentially means that the money market rate remains strictly within the interest-
rate corridor, which is consistent with the experience of central banks that operate a
channel system (see Figures 1 and 2). We again focus on symmetric and stationary
equilibria, where all agents follow identical strategies and where the real allocation is
constant over time.
In what follows, we assume that the central bank does not make lump-sum trans-
fers (￿ = 0), since we have shown that this is optimal for the case when there is
no trade in the money market. With an active money market, central bank loans
satisfy L = ￿H ￿
1 ￿ nH￿
‘H + ￿L ￿
1 ￿ nL￿
‘L and deposits D = ￿HnHdH + ￿LnLdL.
Accordingly, (1) can be written as























23Using the market clearing conditions in the goods and money markets, we can write
this equation as follows











It is interesting to compare (33) with (25) (when ￿ = 0). As before, the entire
stock of money earns interest id. The only di⁄erence is the amount of loans that the
central bank provides. Without a money market, the amount is (1 ￿ n)‘=M; with a
money market, it is ￿L(1 ￿ nL)‘L=M + ￿H(1 ￿ nH)‘H=M.
Let ^ ￿ ￿ R‘=Ry. In the Appendix we prove:
Lemma 3 A symmetric stationary equilibrium where no short-selling constraint is





a policy (id;i‘) satisfying























￿ f(^ ￿￿1)[￿L(1￿nL)qL+￿H(1￿nH)qH]￿"￿L￿H(qL￿qH)^ ￿gR(￿￿1)
R^ ￿￿￿+(1￿n)R^ ￿(￿￿1) (37)







n￿R ; k = H;L, (39)
with b ￿ 0, zL < ￿Rb^ ￿=￿ and zH > ￿zm.
We discuss the policy implications of Lemma 3 in Section 6.
Proposition 4 For any 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿, there exists a critical value "1 > 0, de￿ned in
the proof, such that, if " < "1, a symmetric monetary equilibrium exists where no
short-selling constraint in the money market binds.
Note ￿rst that the system of equations (34) - (39) can be solved recursively. Equa-




from the remaining equations. One then has to check that the re-
quired inequalities hold. The inequality b ￿ 0 simply requires that policy is such that
agents have an incentive to acquire collateral, which is satis￿ed whenever ￿ < ~ ￿
24(de￿ned by (28)). The inequality zL < ￿Rb^ ￿=￿ requires that those agents who are
likely to become buyers are not pledging all their collateral to acquire money in the
money market, and the inequality zH > ￿zm requires that those agents who are likely
to become sellers are not lending all their money.
6 Discussion of the policy implications
We now discuss the key implications of our model for the behavior of the money
market rate, in￿ ation, liquidity, collateral requirement, and the use of interest-rate
rules. These results can be found by inspecting equations (34) and (38). For this
discussion, let us de￿ne the policy interest rate ip ￿ (i‘ + id)=2.
Money market rate In the introduction, we have seen that the money market
rate tends to be in the middle or above the target rate and changes one-to-one with
a shift in the corridor (see also Figures 1 and 2). Our model replicates these facts.
To see this, we can write (38) as follows
iy = i‘ ￿ n￿R￿: (40)
where ￿ = i‘ ￿ id. Inspection of (40) reveals the following result: First, if the spread
￿ is kept constant, iy changes in i‘ one-to-one. Second, if n￿R = 1=2, then iy = ip.20
Our model suggests that the money market interest rate lies exactly on the policy
rate if, for example, n = 1=2 and ￿R ! 1. It is reasonable to assume that n = 1=2,
since it means that on average a bank is equally likely to borrow or to provide cash in
the money market and also equally likely to be either short of money or have excess
cash at the end of the day. The second assumption means that holding collateral has
no cost. Third, as mentioned in the introduction, the Euro money market rate tends
to be above the minimum bid rate ip. Our model has a simple explanation for this
observation. With n = 1=2 and ￿R < 1, we have iy =
i‘(2￿￿R)+id￿R
2 > ip. Thus, costly
collateral generates a money market rate that tends to be above the target rate.
20The ￿rst two results exactly match the behavior of the overnight money market rate of the
channel system operated by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. See Figure 2 in the Introduction.
25In￿ ation To see the implications of our model for in￿ ation, 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿,21 we can
rewrite (34) as follows
1 + ￿ = (1 + iy)=R:
By de￿ning 1 + r ￿ R, we get the standard expression for the Fisher equation
(1 + r)(1 + ￿) = 1 + iy. It is interesting to note that the nominal interest rate
of the Fisher equation is the money market rate iy and not i‘ or id. Using (40), we
can rewrite the Fisher equation as follows:
1 + ￿ = (1 + i‘)=R ￿ n￿￿: (41)
From this expression, it is clear that in￿ ation is increasing in i‘ and id. If we keep
the spread ￿ constant and shift the corridor up, in￿ ation is also increasing. Finally,
in￿ ation is also increasing if we increase the spread ￿ symmetrically around the policy
rate when n < 1=(2￿R). As we have argued above, this condition is likely to be
ful￿lled, since on average n = 1=2, which implies that the inequality reduces to
￿R < 1.
Liquidity We can interpret n as a measure for liquidity in the money market. If
n = 1=2, as mentioned above, banks are equally likely to have excess money or too
little money at the end of the day. If n < 1=2, a bank is more likely to be short
of money at the end of the day. The implications of changes in n for the money
market rate can again be explored by considering (40). From this equation it is clear
that an increase in liquidity (i.e., an increase in n) reduces the money market rate.
Furthermore, n a⁄ects how close the money market rate is to the policy rate.22
Collateral requirement What is the optimal collateral requirement? Inspection
of (40) reveals that a higher return on collateral, R, reduces the money market rate.
From (41), one can also see that an increase in R reduces in￿ ation and, as discussed
above, gets the money market rate closer to the target rate. But the most important
21Since we study steady state allocations, money growth and in￿ ation are perfectly correlated.
Then, through the Fisher equation, long-run money growth and interest rates are positively corre-
lated, as con￿rmed by the data (see McCandless and Weber 1995).
22In practice, central banks attempt to in￿ uence n through open market operations. We leave
this aspect of the model to future research.
26aspect of the collateral requirement is that it a⁄ects the real allocation. Inspection
of (39) reveals that an increase in R yields higher consumption and, consequently,
higher welfare. Therefore, in practice, optimal collateral requirements do not distort
market participants￿portfolio choices. That is, market participants should hold assets
eligible as collateral because they yield high returns and not because of the liquidity
premium implied by the borrowing facility.
Interest-rate rules Finally, a central bank can tighten its policy without changing
its policy rate by simply increasing the corridor symmetrically around the policy rate.








It is evident that @￿=@i‘ > 0. Hence, from (39), a symmetric increase of the spread
around the policy rate decreases consumption.
Therefore, in a channel system, interest-rate rules (i.e., rules that specify a path for
the policy rate ip) are incomplete. The reason is that such a rule does not determine
whether a policy is ￿tight￿or ￿loose.￿Rather, in a channel system, any policy must
be characterized through an interest-rate corridor rule.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the theoretical properties of a channel system of interest-rate con-
trol in a dynamic general equilibrium model with in￿nitely lived agents and a central
bank. With this model, we could match several stylized facts regarding the use of
channel systems by central banks. Moreover, we could derive several policy implica-
tions that we have summarized in Section 6. Perhaps the most important result is
that interest-rate rules are meaningless in a channel system. In a channel system, any
policy must be characterized through an interest-rate corridor rule. This is a new
insight, which goes beyond what we already know from the large and growing body
of literature on the optimal design of interest-rate rules.
While our paper is a ￿rst step toward analyzing a channel system in a general
equilibrium model, many aspects have remained unexplored. For example, why is
27there so little volatility in New Zealand￿ s money-market interest rate (see Figure 2)
and so much in the case of the European Central Bank (Figure 1)? Moreover, we
know little about optimal monetary policy in a channel system under stress due to
aggregate shocks. These are some of the issues left for future research.
Finally, a complementary modeling approach addresses monetary policy as a
mechanism design problem (e.g., Wallace, 2005). Such an approach could potentially
explain why central banks increasingly use channel systems to implement monetary
policy. Our paper could not answer this question, since we have taken the channel
mechanism as given to study its properties.
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To understand some of the features of our environment, it is useful to have some
information on how the money market functions and on monetary policy procedures
at central banks that operate a standing facility. This section does not aim at being
general, and we will, therefore, concentrate on the case of the euro money markets
and the ECB￿ s operating procedures.
Operating procedures of the ECB The ECB has two main instruments for the
implementation of its monetary policy. First, it conducts weekly main re￿nancing
operations that are collateralized loans with a one-week maturity. Main re￿nancing
operations are implemented using a liquidity auction, where banks bid for liquidity.
Bids consist of an amount of liquidity and an interest rate. The total amount to be
allocated is announced before the auction. Following the auction, the ECB allocates
liquidity according to the bidded rates, in a descending order. The minimum bid rate
is the main policy rate used by the ECB to implement monetary policy.
Second, the ECB o⁄ers a lending facility with a lending rate that is 100 basis
points higher than its minimum bid rate, and a deposit facility, with a deposit rate
that is 100 basis points below its minimum bid rate. At the lending facility, liquidity
is provided either in the form of overnight repurchase agreements or as overnight
collateralized loans, whereby the ownership of the asset is retained by the debtor.
In both cases, banks have to resort to safe, eligible assets as de￿ned by the ECB.
Eligible banks can access the standing facilities at any time of the day. The use of
the standing facility largely depends on banks￿activities on the euro money markets
during the day.
The euro money markets There are two segments for the euro money market.
The ￿rst segment is the unsecured money market, where banks borrow and lend
cash to each other without resorting to collateral. The reference interest rate on the
23This section draws heavily on materials from ECB (2005), ECB (2004), BIS (2003), and Hart-
mann, Manna and Manzanares (2001).
32unsecured money market is the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA), calculated
by the ECB. The second segment is the secured money market where agents lend
at di⁄erent maturities against collateral. This is the largest money market segment.
There are several reference interest rates, depending on maturities (Euro Interbank
O⁄ered Rates, or Euribors) and on whether the collateral pledged belongs to a general
collateral pool (Euripo).
Transactions on both segments of the money market are settled using the two
large-value payment systems operating in the euro area, the Trans-European Auto-
mated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and Euro1.
These large-value payment systems are essential in ￿nalizing the transfer of funds
for transactions taking place in money markets. Therefore, the opening and closing
hours of money markets are closely related to the operating hours of these payment
systems.
TARGET settles payments with immediate ￿nality in central bank money and
operates between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. C.E.T. with a cut-o⁄time of 5 p.m. for customer
payments.24 Eligible institutions hold accounts at TARGET, which are debited or
credited depending on market participants￿orders. Intraday credit is provided free
of charge as long as it is fully collateralized. Banks may also access the deposit or
lending facilities after making a request at the latest 30 minutes after the actual
closing time of TARGET.25 After the close of TARGET, an overdraft position on a
bank￿ s TARGET account is automatically transformed into an overnight loan via a
recourse to the lending facility, again against eligible assets.
Euro1 is a private, large-value payment system o⁄ered by the Euro Banking As-
sociation (EBA). Euro1 functions as a sort of netting system, whereby on each set-
tlement day, at any given time, each participant will have only one single payment
obligation or claim with respect to the community of other participants as joint cred-
itors/debtors. In particular, there are no bilateral payments, claims or obligations
between participants. Euro1 settles in central bank money at the ECB at the end of
the day. After the cut-o⁄ time of 4 p.m. C.E.T., clearing banks with debit positions
will pay their single obligations into the EBA settlement account at the ECB through
24The unsecured segment opens around 8 a.m. and closes around 5:45 p.m.
25On the last Eurosystem business day of a minimum reserve maintenance period, the deposit
facility can be accessed for 60 minutes after the actual closing of TARGET.
33TARGET. After all amounts due have been received, the ECB will pay the clearing
banks with credit positions also using TARGET.
In this paper, we model two speci￿c features of the description above. First,
banks cannot carry overnight overdrafts on their TARGET accounts, and they have
to borrow either on the money markets or at the lending facility in order to cover their
TARGET positions. When TARGET closes, euro money markets are also closed. As
a consequence, the central bank standing facility is, at the end of the day, the only
recourse to overnight liquidity. Also, since participants can access the standing facility
30 minutes after the close of TARGET, any late payments received on a TARGET
account can be deposited at the standing facility of the ECB. In the ￿rst part of the
paper, we model this aspect of the liquidity management problem. Second, banks
can predict when a payment is due or incoming so that, with a well-functioning
money market, the likelihood of resorting to the standing facilities should be small.
However, there may be unexpected payments to be made that can force banks to
hold an overdraft on their TARGET account. In the second part of the paper, we
add a money market to the model. There, banks are able to trade their liquidity
when they are con￿dent that they will end up the day with a credit on their central
bank account. Given it is the most important segment of the money market, we
concentrate on the secured interbank money market.
8.2 Channel system of the Bank of England
Here, we discuss the channel system operated by the Bank of England. As shown in
Figure 4, the Sterling Overnight Interbank Average rate (SONIA) was very volatile
until the ￿rst quarter of 2006. Before this date the bank￿ s implementation framework
consisted of a 100-basis-point corridor, non-remunerated daily reserves requirements
and a somewhat restricted access to the borrowing facility.26 From January 2000
to May 2006, the SONIA was on average 5 basis points below the Bank of England
target rate, while the daily gilt repo rate with two-week maturity was on average
11 basis points below the target rate over the same period. Furthermore, the bank
decreased its target rate from 4% to 3.75% in February 2003. However, the SONIA
26For details on the Bank of England implementation framework, we refer the reader to Clews
(2005).
34averaged 3.95% over the period when the bank rate was 4%, and averaged 3.76% after
its easing. Hence, while monetary policy targeted a 25-basis-point easing, the Bank






















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: The channel system of the Bank of England
Source: European Banking Federation and ECB
Hence, the implementation framework was not very e¢ cient in implementing mon-
etary policy. As a result of this ine¢ ciency, the Bank of England reformed its im-
plementation framework in 2006. It introduced 1) a 25-basis-point corridor on the
last day of the maintenance period, 2) remuneration on reserves within limits at the
o¢ cial bank rate and 3) open market operations to ensure that there is an equal (and
small) chance of using either facility. As Figure 4 illustrates, this reform resulted in
an immediate decrease in the variability of the SONIA and repo rates. Furthermore,
the SONIA is now on average 5 basis points above the bank￿ s target rate, and more
surprisingly, the repo rate is also on average 5 basis points above the target rate.
Therefore, the reform of the monetary implementation framework increased the aver-
age di⁄erence between the bank￿ s target rate and the SONIA by 10 basis points and
the di⁄erence between the repo rate and the bank￿ s target rate by 16 basis points.
358.3 Welfare
In this Appendix, we show that if the central bank￿ s objective is to maximize the
expected discounted utility of the representative agent, the central bank￿ s objective
is to maximize (2). To derive (2), we must ￿rst calculate hours worked in market 1.
The money holdings at the opening of the ￿rst market are ~ m = 0, having bought,
and ~ m = m + pqs, having sold. Hence, hours worked are
hb = ￿[m+ + (1 + i‘)‘] ￿ (R ￿ 1)b ￿ ￿￿M
hs = ￿[m+ ￿ (1 + id)(m + pqs)] ￿ (R ￿ 1)b ￿ ￿￿M:
Since h = nhs+(1￿n)hb, by using (1) and rearranging we get h = ￿(R￿1)b. Then,
welfare is given by




j f(1 ￿ n)[u(q) ￿ q] + (R ￿ 1)bg
=




Proof of Proposition 1. For ease of exposition, we assume ￿ = 0. The proof can
be easily replicated when ￿ > 0. We ￿rst prove the only if part. Assume ￿rst z‘ = 0
and zm > 0. Then from (24) and (25) we get
1 ￿ ￿
￿
= (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q) ￿ 1] (42)
and from (23) we have
1 ￿ R￿
R￿
￿ (1 ￿ n)[u
0(q)=￿ ￿ 1]: (43)
Use (43) to replace u0(q) in (42) and rearrange to get ￿ ￿ ~ ￿.
Assume now that z‘ > 0 and zm > 0. Then from (25) z‘ > 0 implies that 1+id > ￿.
Use (24) to replace ￿ and rearrange to get ￿ < ~ ￿. Next divide (25) by 1 + id and
solve for ￿ to get
￿ = 1 +
zm
z‘
1 + id ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ n)(1 + id)
> 1
since 1 + id > ￿. Hence, we have 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿, if z‘ > 0 and zm > 0.
36Finally, assume that z‘ > 0 and zm = 0. Then, the previous equation immediately
implies that ￿ = 1.
We now prove the if part. From (24) and (25) we get
1 ￿ n￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n)u











￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n)u
0(q) (45)
Assume ￿rst that 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿. Use (44) to rewrite (45) as follows











0 < ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿





Hence, 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿ implies
z‘
zm > 0.
Assume next that ￿ ￿ ~ ￿. Then from (44) we have
1 ￿ n￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n)u
0(q) ￿ (1 ￿ n)
￿




Then z‘ > 0 immediately implies that
0 > ~ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ n)
￿





which is a contradiction. Hence ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ implies z‘ = 0.
Existence and uniqueness when ~ ￿ ￿ ￿: In this case z‘ = b = 0 and from
(25) ￿ = 1 + id. Then, from (24) and (25) we get (42). Since the right-hand side of
(42) is strictly decreasing in q, there exists a unique q that solves (42). Finally, from
(26) we have zm = q.
Existence and uniqueness when 1 < ￿ < ~ ￿: The system of equations (23)-
(26) with z‘ = ￿Rb=￿ can be reduced as follows. Equations (26) and z‘ = ￿Rb=￿
imply zm = q ￿ ￿Rb=￿. Then, multiply both sides of (25) by zm and replace zm to
get
(q ￿ ￿Rb=￿)[￿ ￿ (1 + id)] = ￿(1 ￿ n)z‘(i‘ ￿ id):
37Use (24) to eliminate ￿ and rearrange to get
(q ￿ ￿Rb=￿)f1 ￿ (1 ￿ n)￿[u




Hence, an equilibrium is de￿ned by the following two equations:
1
R￿
= (1 ￿ n)u
0(q)=￿ + n
(q ￿ ￿Rb=￿)f1 ￿ (1 ￿ n)￿[u




We can use the ￿rst equation to replace for u0(q) in the second to get
1
R￿
= (1 ￿ n)u
0(q)=￿ + n
q = ￿RbF(￿):
If we substitute q in the ￿rst expression, we get
1
R￿
= (1 ￿ n)u
0 [￿RbF(￿)]=￿ + n ￿ RHS: (46)
The left-hand side of (46) is constant while the right-hand side is decreasing in b for
a given 1 ￿ ￿ < ~ ￿. Moreover, we have limb!0 RHS = +1 and limb!1 RHS = n <
1
R￿. Hence, for any policy ￿ with 1 ￿ ￿ < ~ ￿, a unique b > 0 exists. Then, from (30)
a unique value for q exists. Accordingly, a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium
exists.
Finally, we have lim￿!~ ￿ F(￿) = +1 and so b ! 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We ￿rst show that ￿ = 0 is optimal. Note that ^ q is
independent of ￿, and ~ q is decreasing in ￿. Therefore, increasing ￿ does only decrease
the lower bound of the set of attainable allocations. Second, F(￿;￿) is decreasing
in ￿, so that an increase in ￿ either increases b, decreases q, or both. This reduces
welfare. Hence, since ￿ ￿ 0, it is optimal to set ￿ to zero.
We now assume ￿ = 0. Substituting (31) into the objective function, the problem
becomes
max







s.t. ^ q ￿ q ￿ ~ q:
38After rearranging, the ￿rst-order condition is
(1 ￿ n)[u










= ^ ￿ ￿ ~ ￿
where ^ ￿ is the multiplier of the ￿rst inequality, and ~ ￿ is the multiplier of the second
inequality. Consider the ￿rst-order condition and note that
￿(q) =
R￿ (1 ￿ n)u0 (q)
1 ￿ nR￿
:
Suppose that the optimal q is such that ￿ = 1; i.e., q = ^ q. In this case, ~ ￿ = 0 and







u00 (^ q) ^ q
u0 (^ q)
< 0
which is a contradiction. Thus, in any equilibrium q < ^ q, implying ￿ > 1.
Now suppose that the optimal q is such that ￿ = ~ ￿; i.e., q = ~ q. In this case,
~ ￿ > 0 and ^ ￿ = 0, implying that ￿(~ q;R) < 0. One can show that lim￿!~ ￿ F (￿) = 1,
lim￿!~ ￿ F 0 (￿) = 1, lim￿!~ ￿
F0(￿)￿





Moreover, (1 ￿ n)[u0(q) ￿ 1] = 1=￿ ￿ 1. Accordingly, we get





(R ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)
u00 (~ q) ~ q
u0 (~ q)
Consider ￿rst R ! 1. Then we have limR!1 ￿(~ q;R) = ￿1. Now consider R ! 1=￿.









= 0. Thus, if
R < R, q = ~ q and if R > R, q solves ￿(q;R) = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. A stationary equilibrium requires that M+=M = ￿=￿+ = ￿.
To prove Lemma 3, note ￿rst that using the fact that ￿
k





‘ +i‘ and ￿
k
d = id, the marginal value of money, the marginal value of collateral
and the marginal value of private debt in market 3 can be written as follows
V
k
m = ￿￿+ (1 + id)
￿























y = ￿￿￿+ (1 + iy)
￿








39To derive (34) rewrite the ￿rst-order condition (5) by using equations (15), (10),













































Finally, combine (50) with (51) to get (34).
To derive (35), note that in any equilibrium, the budget constraints in the goods




k = M + y
k + ‘
k; k = H;L. (52)
Then, use (52) to substitute yH and yL in the money market￿ s market clearing con-
dition (12) and rearrange to get (35).
To derive (36) combine (12) and (52).
To derive (37), use (34) to write (33) as follows
R^ ￿ ￿ ￿








Then, use (52) to substitute ‘H and ‘L and rearrange to get
R^ ￿￿￿
R^ ￿(￿￿1) = ￿(1 ￿ n) + 1
zm
￿
￿L(1 ￿ nL)qL + ￿H(1 ￿ nH)qH ￿ ￿L(nH ￿ nL)zL￿
:
Finally use (36) and solve for zm to get (37).
Note that equations (50) - (37) must hold in any monetary equilibrium, where
agents hold collateral. We now consider the case where no short-selling constraint is
binding in the money market to derive (38) and (39).





and so from (7) V L
m + V L
y = V H
m + V H






(￿ ￿ ^ ￿)
(^ ￿ ￿ 1)
; k = H;L.
Using these expressions to replace u0(qH) and u0(qL) in (50), and solving for ^ ￿ yields
(38). Finally, to derive (39) use (38) to replace ^ ￿ in the above equations.
40Proof of Proposition 4. The ￿rst thing to note is that the system of equations (34)
- (39) can be solved recursively as described in the text. It remains to be shown under
which conditions the short-selling constraints in the money market are non-binding.
Thus, we need to verify that yk < Rb=
￿
￿+ (1 + iy)
￿
and that m + yk > 0. Using
the seller￿ s ￿rst-order condition and dividing by p, we can write these conditions as
follows
z
k < ￿Rb^ ￿=￿ and zm + z
k > 0:
Since zL > zH, it is su¢ cient to check that zL < ￿Rb^ ￿=￿. Along the same lines,
since zL > zH, it is su¢ cient to check that zH > ￿zm.
Let us ￿rst consider whether zH > ￿zm. From (36) and (37) zH > ￿zm if
￿L ￿
qL ￿ qH￿




R^ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
=[R(￿ ￿ 1)] + (1 ￿ n) ^ ￿. Note that ￿ > (1 ￿ n) ^ ￿ since
R^ ￿ > ￿.
Then nH ￿nL = " and ￿LnL +￿HnH = n yield nH = n+￿L" and nL = n￿￿H".
Using these relations and rearranging yields














^ ￿ ￿ 1
￿
(1 ￿ n) + "￿H
i
< ￿ + ￿H
￿L
￿
^ ￿ ￿ 1
￿
(1 ￿ n) + "￿H:
The left-hand side is larger than zero since ￿ > (1 ￿ n) ^ ￿. Moreover, it is strictly
smaller than the right-hand side at " = 0 (since qL = qH at " = 0). Then, divide the
inequality by
h
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n)
￿










The left-hand side is increasing in " and the right-hand side is decreasing. Therefore,
there is a unique ~ "1, such that zH > ￿zm when " < ~ "1.
We next check ￿Rb^ ￿=￿ > zL. From ￿HqH + ￿LqL = zm +
￿Rb
￿ , we need ￿HqH +
￿LqL > zm + zL=^ ￿, or replacing for zm and zL, and rearranging we need
￿HqH + ￿LqL >






^ ￿ ￿ 1
￿
and arrange to obtain
￿
￿HqH + ￿LqL￿ ^ ￿ ￿ qL >
^ ￿f(^ ￿￿1)[￿L(1￿nL)qL+￿H(1￿nH)qH]￿(nH￿nL)￿L￿H(qL￿qH)^ ￿g
￿ :


























This expression is satis￿ed at " = 0, since we have ￿ > (1￿n)^ ￿. Dividing both sides






￿ < ￿ ￿
￿
^ ￿ ￿ 1
￿











qL is decreasing in ", the left-hand side is increasing in ", and the right-hand
side is also increasing in ". Therefore, given this constraint does not bind at " = 0,
either it never binds or it binds for some " > ￿ "1. Thus, if " < "1 = minf~ "1;￿ "1g, a
unique equilibrium exists where no short-selling constraint binds.
42